Abstract. A redactable signature scheme for a string of objects supports verification even if multiple substrings are removed from the original string. It is important that the redacted string and its signature do not reveal anything about the content of the removed substrings. Existing schemes completely or partially leak a piece of information: the lengths of the removed substrings. Such length information could be crucial for many applications, especially when the removed substring has low entropy. We propose a scheme that can hide the length. Our scheme consists of two components. The first component H, which is a "collision resistant" hash, maps a string to an unordered set, whereby existing schemes on unordered sets can then be applied. However, a sequence of random numbers has to be explicitly stored and thus it produces a large signature of size at least (mk)-bits where m is the number of objects and k is the size of a key sufficiently large for cryptographic operations. The second component uses RGGM tree, a variant of GGM tree, to generate the pseudo random numbers from a short seed, expected to be of size O(k + tk log m) where t is the number of removed substrings. Unlike GGM tree, the structure of the proposed RGGM tree is random. By an intriguing statistical property of the random tree, the redacted tree does not reveal the lengths of the substrings removed. The hash function H and the RGGM tree can be of independent interests.
Introduction
We are interested in a signature scheme for strings of objects whereby the authenticity of a string can be verified even if it is redacted, that is, some substrings have been removed. Let x = x 1 x 2 . . . x m be a string, for example a text document where each object can be a character or a word, or an audio file where each object is a sample. The string x is signed by the authority and both the string and its signature (x, s) are passed to another party, say Alice. Alice wants to show Bob x but Bob is not authorized to view certain parts of the string, ⋆ A short version [CLX09] of this paper is accepted by CT-RSA 09. say x 2 x 3 x 4 and x 7 . Thus, Alice shows Bob x = x 1 ⋄ x 5 x 6 ⋄ x 8 . . . x m where each ⋄ indicates the location of a removed substring. On the other hand, Bob may want to verify the authenticity of x. A redactable signature scheme allows Alice to produce a valid signature s for the redacted string x, even if Alice does not have the authority's secret key. From the new signature s, Bob can then verify that x is indeed a redacted version of a string signed by the authority.
Unlike the usual signature schemes, redactable signature scheme has additional requirement on privacy: information of the removed strings should be hidden. In this paper, we consider the stringent requirement that, Bob could not obtain any information of any removed substring, except the fact that a nonempty substring has been removed at each location ⋄. This simple requirement turns out to be difficult to achieve. Existing schemes are unable to completely hide a piece of usually important information: the length of each removed substring. Note that information on length could be crucial if the substring has low entropy. For example, if the substring is either "Approved" or "Not Approved", then its length reveals everything. There are scenarios and applications where the lengths of the removed strings should not be hidden. As noted by Johnson et al. [JMSW02] , semantic attack could be possible in some scenarios if the length information is hidden. On the other side, there are also applications where the fact that a string has been redacted must be hidden. Our scheme can be modified to cater for the above scenarios. The redactable signature scheme proposed by Johnson et al. [JMSW02] employs a Merkle tree [Mer80] and a GGM tree [GGM86] to generate a short signature. However, it is easy to derive the length from the structures of the redacted Merkle and GGM trees. A straightforward modification by introducing randomness into the tree structure also does not hide the length completely. Schemes by Johnson et al. [JMSW02] (set-homomorphic signatures) and Miyazaki et al. [MHI06] are designed for unordered sets and are not applicable for a string. A way to extend their schemes to strings is by assigning a sequence of increasing random numbers to the objects [MHI06] . However, this leads to large signatures since the random numbers have to be explicitly stored, and more importantly, it is insecure since the gaps in the sequence reveal some information about the number of removed objects.
In this paper, we propose a scheme that can hide the lengths of the removed substrings. Our scheme incorporates two components: a hash, and a random tree with a hiding property. We first give a scheme RSS using the first component, and then another scheme SRSS with both components. The first component hashes a string of objects to an unordered set. For the unordered set, existing redactable schemes [MHI06, JMSW02] on unordered sets can be applied. The scheme RSS satisfies the requirements on unforgeability and privacy preserving under reasonable cryptographic assumptions. However, it produces a large signature. Essentially, the main portion of the signature is a sequence of random numbers r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r m , where each r i is associated with the i-th object in the string.
The goal of the second component is to reduce the signature size by replacing the r i 's with a sequence of pseudo random numbers, generated from a small seed t. If a substring is removed, the corresponding random numbers have to be removed accordingly. Thus, generating the random numbers iteratively starting from the seed violates privacy, since the seed t reveals all the random numbers.
We employ a variant of GGM binary tree to generate the r i 's in a top-down manner, where the r i 's are at the leaves, and the seed t is at the root. Unlike the GGM tree which is balanced, we use a random binary tree where the structure of the binary tree is random. After a substring is removed, the associated leaves and all their ancestors are to be removed, resulting in a collection of subtrees (Figure 1 ). The roots of the subtrees collectively form the new seed t for the redacted r i 's. Note that from the structures of the subtrees, an adversary might still derive some information of the length of a removed substring. Our main observation is that, by choosing an appropriate tree generation algorithm, the structure of the subtrees reveals nothing about the size of the original tree. Consider a game between Alice and Bob. Suppose Alice randomly picks a binary tree and it is equal likely that the tree contains 1000 leaves or 9 leaves. Now Alice redacts the tree by removing one substring and only 8 leaves are left. From the structure of the remaining subtrees (for example Figure 1(b) ), Bob tries to guess the size of the original tree. Now, if Alice employs a tree generation algorithm with the hiding property, Bob cannot succeed with probability more than 0.5. This hiding property is rather counter-intuitive. Since the size of the tree is involved in the tree generation and thus intuitively the information about the size of the tree is spread throughout the tree. Thus it is quite surprising that the global information on size can be completely removed by deleting some nodes. Contribution and Organization. 1. We propose a "collision resistant" hash H that maps strings to unordered sets.
From H we obtain RSS, a redactable signature scheme for strings. Unlike previously known methods, RSS is able to hide the lengths of the removed substrings. We show that RSS is secure against chosen message attack (Theorem 2) and privacy preserving (Theorem 3) under resonable assumptions, which are weaker than random oracle assumption. However, the signature size is large. It consists of km + kt + κ bits, where κ is the size of the signature produced by a known redactable signature scheme for unordered sets, m is the number of objects in the redacted string, t is the number of substrings removed, and k is a security parameter (e.g. k = 1024). 2. We observe a hiding property of a random tree (Theorem 4). Based on the observation, we propose RGGM, a pseudo random number generator which can be viewed as a randomized version of GGM [GGM86] . If multiple substrings of pseudo random numbers are to be removed, we can efficiently find a new seed that generates the retained numbers, and yet it is computationally difficult to derive the content and length of each removed substring from the new seed, except the locations of the removed substrings. 3. We propose SRSS by incorporating RGGM into RSS. The expected size of the signature is in κ + O(k + kt log m). SRSS is secure against chosen message attack (Corollary 5) and privacy preserving (Corollary 6).
Related Work
Johnson et al. [JMSW02] introduced redactable signature schemes which enable verification of a redacted signed document. Signature scheme with similar property has also been proposed for XML documents [SBZ01] , where the redaction operation is to remove XML nodes. The redactable signature scheme on strings is closely related to directed transitive signature scheme [MR02, Yi07] . It is possible to convert a directed transitive signature scheme to a redactable signature scheme on strings. However, existing directed transitive signature schemes do not provide privacy in the sense that the resulting signatures reveal some information about the removed substrings.
Formulation and Background
Johnson et al. [JMSW02] gave definitions on homomorphic signature schemes and their security for binary operators. It can be easily adapted for binary relations.
A string is a sequence of objects from an object space (or alphabet) O. For example, O can be the set of ASCII characters, collection of words, or audio samples, etc. After a few substrings are removed from x, the string x may break into substrings, say x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x u . The redacted string ( x, e), which we call annotated string 1 , is represented by the string x = x 1 x 2 . . . is a redacted string of the original xxxabcyyyda. For convenient, we sometimes use a sequence of objects like x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , . . . , x m and a string of objects like
Let us define a binary relation ≻ between annotated strings. Given two annotated strings X 1 = (x 1 , e 1 ) and X 2 = (x 2 , e 2 ), we say X 1 ≻ X 2 , if either x 2 can be obtained from x 1 by removing a non-empty substring in x 1 , and the e 2 is updated from e 1 accordingly, or there is a X s.t. X 1 ≻ X and X ≻ X 2 .
Definition 1 (Redactable Signature Scheme [JMSW02] ) A redactable signature scheme with respect to binary relation ⊢, is a tuple of probabilistic polynomial time algorithms (KGen, Sign, Verify, Redact), such that 1. for any message x, σ = Sign SK (x) ⇒ Verify PK (x, σ) = TRUE; 2. for any messages x and y, such that x ⊢ y,
where (PK, SK) ← KGen(1 k ) and k is the security parameter.
Both Johnson et al. [JMSW02] and Miyazaki et al. [MHI06] presented a redactable signature scheme w.r.t superset relation. Johnson et al. [JMSW02] also gave security definition for homomorphic signature schemes. We adapt their definition for redactable signature scheme. Let ⊢ denote a binary relation. For any set S, let span ⊢ (S) denote the set {x : ∃y ∈ S, s.t. y ⊢ x}.
Definition 2 (Unforgeability of Redactable Signature Scheme [JMSW02])
A redactable signature scheme KGen, Sign, Verify, Redact is (t, q, ǫ)-unforgeable against existential forgeries with respect to ⊢ under adaptive chosen message attack, if any adversary A that makes at most q chosen-message queries adaptively and runs in time at most t, has advantage AdvA ≤ ǫ. The advantage of an adversary A is defined as the probability that, after queries on ℓ (ℓ ≤ q) messages x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x ℓ , A outputs a valid signature σ for some message x ∈ span ⊢ ({x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x ℓ }). Formally,
where the probability is taken over the random coins used by KGen, Sign and A.
Redactable signature schemes have an additional security requirement on privacy [ACMT05] : the adversary should not be able to derive any information about the removed substrings from a redacted string and its signature.
Definition 3 (Privacy Preserving) A redactable signature scheme KGen, Sign, Verify, Redact is privacy preserving if, given the public key PK and any annotated strings X 1 , X 2 , X , such that X 1 ≻ X and X 2 ≻ X , the following distributions S 1 and S 2 are computationally indistinguishable:
where r 1 and r 2 are random coins used by Sign and Redact respectively, and public/private key (PK, SK) is generated by KGen.
RSS: Redactable Signature Scheme for Strings
We propose RSS, a redactable signature scheme for strings that is able to hide the lengths of the removed substrings. Our approach is as follows: we first propose a hash function H that maps an annotated string x and an auxiliary input y to an unordered set. This hash is "collision resistant" and satisfies some properties on substring removal. Using H and some known redactable signature schemes for unordered sets, we have a redactable signature scheme for strings.
Hashing strings to unordered sets
Let H be a hash function that maps an annotated string X and an auxiliary input y, which could be a sequence of numbers from a finite field, to a (unordered) set of elements from some universe. In our construction (Table 1) , H maps the input to a set of 3-tuples from Z n × Z n × Z n , where n is some chosen parameter.
Definition 4 (Collision Resistant) H is (t, ǫ)-collision-resistant if, for any algorithm A with running time at most t,
where (X 1 , X 2 , y 2 ) is the output of A on input y 1 , and the probability is taken over uniformly randomly chosen y 1 and random coins used by A.
To be used in constructing a secure string redactable signature scheme, besides collision resistance, the hash function H is also required to be 1)"redactable": given X 1 , X 2 and y 1 , such that X 1 ≻ X 2 , it is easy to find y 2 such that H(X 1 , y 1 ) ⊃ H(X 2 , y 2 ); 2) privacy preserving: H(X 2 , y 2 ) must not reveal any information about the removed substring. The property on privacy preserving is essential and used in the proof of Theorem 3. However, for simplicity, we will not explicitly formulate the requirement here.
Construction of H
We present a hash function H(·, ·) in Table 1 based on some hash function h.
Let n be a RSA modulus, and h : Zn → Zn be a hash function. Given x = x1x2 . . . xm associated with annotation e, r = r1r2r3 . . . rm, and w = w1w2w3 . . . wm, where for each i, xi, ri, wi ∈ Zn (i.e. x, r and w are strings over alphabet Zn), we define H as 
Remarks on the construction of H.
1. The witness w should be consistent with the annotation e, because w is supposed to implicitly describe the locations of the removed substrings. For any 1 < i ≤ m, w i−1 = w i means a non-empty substring has been removed just between x i−1 and x i . If 2 w 1 = g, this indicates that a non-empty substring is removed from the front of the string x. We assume that there are no substrings removed from the end of a string. Because of this correspondence, we may omit the explicit annotation e in the use of H for simplicity. 2. It is crucial that the value of r i is explicitly represented in t i for each i (Table 1) . If the r i 's are omitted, then it is easy to find collisions. Table 1 , is (poly 1 (k), 1 poly2(k) )-collision-resistant for any positive polynomials poly 1 (·) and poly 2 (·), where k is the security parameter, i.e. the bit length of n, assuming that h is division intractable 3 and always outputs odd prime integers, and Strong RSA Problem is hard.
Lemma 1 The hash function H as defined in
Appendix A gives the proof sketch. Basically, the proof reduces Strong RSA Problem or Division Problem [GHR99] to the collision finding problem.
Construction of RSS
We construct a redactable signature scheme RSS, which consists of four algorithms TGen, Sign, Verify, and Redact, for strings with respect to binary relation ≻ based on the hash function H defined in Table 1 and some redactable signature scheme SSS for sets with respect to superset relation ⊇.
2 Here g is an element of large order from Z * n . If there are no redaction at the front of x, w1 = g. See the use of H in Table 3 . 3 Division intractability [GHR99] implies collision resistance.
The signer chooses a RSA modulus n and an element g of large order in Z * n . Both n and g are public. Let the object space be Z n , that is, a string is a sequence of integers from Z n . Let h : Z n → Z n be a collision resistant hash which satisfies the division intractable property [GHR99] and always outputs odd prime numbers 4 . In practice, hash function like h(x) = SHA1(x) 1 may be sufficient. Let SSS = (keygen, sig, vrf, rec) be a redactable signature scheme for unordered sets w.r.t superset relation ⊇. The signer also needs to choose the public and secret key pair (PK, SK), which is actually used by the underlying signature scheme SSS. The details of KGen, Sign, Verify, and Redact are presented in Table 2, Table 3 , Table 4 and Table 5 .
The
KGen. Given security parameter k.
1. Choose a RSA modulus n, and an element g of large order in Zn. 2. Run key generating algorithm keygen on input 1 k to get key (PK, SK). 3. Output (n, g, PK) as public key and SK as private key. Sign. Given x = x1x2 . . . xm and its associated annotation e = m .
1. Let wi = g for each i. Choose m distinct random numbers r1, r2, . . . , rm. Let r = r1r2r3 . . . rm and w = w1w2w3 . . . wm. Compute t = H((x, e), (r, w)).
2. Sign the set t using SSS with the secret key SK to obtain s:
3. The final signature consists of the random numbers ri's, witnesses wi's, and the signature s. That is, (r, w, s) or (r1, r2, . . . , rm; w1, w2, . . . , wm; s) Table 3 . RSS: Sign.
Verify.
Given a string x = x1x2 . . . xm associated with annotation e, its signature (r, w, s), the public information n, g, and the public key PK of SSS. Redact. Given a string x = x1x2 . . . xm associated with annotation e, and its signature (r, w, s), where r = r1r2 . . . rm, w = w1w2 . . . wm, the public information n, g, public key PK for SSS, and (i, j) the location of the string to be removed (that is xixi+1 . . . xj is to be removed). 
If
e and w are not consistent, output FALSE. 2. Compute t = H(x, (r, w)). 3. (r, w, s) is a valid signature of x under RSS, if and only if s is a valid signature of t under SSS, i.e. vrfPK(t, s) = TRUE.
Update
e to obtain new annotationê. Compute u = Q j k=i h(r k ), to update the witnesses in the following way: for each ℓ > j, update w l w ℓ ← w u ℓ mod n.
Computeŝ = recPK(t, s,t)
where t = H((x, e), (r, w)). 4. Output (r,ŵ,ŝ) as the signature of (x,ê). Theorem 2 RSS is (t, q, ǫ1 1−ǫ2 )-unforgeable against existential forgeries with respect to relation ≻, if SSS is (t + qt 0 , q, ǫ 1 )-unforgeable against existential forgeries with respect to superset relation ⊇, and H is (t + qt 1 , ǫ 2 )-collision-resistant, where t 0 is the running time of H and t 1 is the time needed by RSS to sign a document.
The proof sketch is given in Appendix B. Our construction of H (Table 1) is collision resistant (Lemma 1). Johnson et al. [JMSW02] showed their redactable signature scheme Sig (in Section 5 of [JMSW02] ) is (t, q, ǫ)-unforgeable under reasonable assumptions (see Theorem 1 in [JMSW02] ), for some proper parameters t, q and ǫ. Miyazaki et al. [MHI06] also showed a similar result on the unforgeability of the redactable signature scheme they proposed. Hence, conditions in Theorem 2 can be satisfied. The proof sketch of Theorem 3 is in Appendix C. Interestingly, RSS is privacy preserving, without any assumptions on the privacy preserving property of SSS. This is because the relevant information is already removed by H during redaction.
Theorem 3 The redactable signature scheme RSS is privacy preserving (as defined in Definition 3), assuming that hash function

Efficiency
The size of s depends on SSS, and let us assume it requires κ bits. The number of distinct w i 's is about the same as the number of redactions occurred. So w i 's can be represented in t(k + ⌈log m⌉) bits, where t is the number of substrings removed, and k is the bit length of n. Thus the total number of bits required is at most k(m + t) + t⌈log m⌉ + κ. One may ignore the term t⌈log m⌉ since it is used to specify the locations of removed substrings, which could be treated as part of the message. Hence, the size of signature is essentially km + kt + κ. The dominant term is km, which is the total size of the random numbers r i 's.
Disregarding the time taken by the scheme SSS, and the time required to compute the hash h(·), during signing, O(m) of k-bits exponentiation operations are required. During redaction, if ℓ consecutive objects are to be removed between position i and j, and t ′ number of redactions have been made after position j, then the number of k-bit exponentiation operations is at most ℓ(t ′ + 1), which is in O(ℓm). During verification, O(tm) number of k-bits exponentiation operations are required. Hence, our scheme is suitable for small t, which is reasonable in practice. In sum, the main drawback of RSS is the size of its signature. In the next section, we will reduce its size using a random tree.
RGGM: Random tree with Hiding property
We propose RGGM, a variant of GGM tree [GGM86] to generate a sequence of pseudo random numbers, where the structure of the tree is randomized. This generator provides us with the ability to remove multiple substrings 5 of pseudo random numbers, while still being able to generate the retained numbers from a short seed. The expected size of the new seed is in O(k + tk log m) where t is the number of removed substrings, m is the number of pseudo random numbers, and k is a security parameter. More importantly, the new seed does not reveal any information about the size nor the content of the removed substrings.
Pseudo random number generation. To generate m pseudo random numbers we employ a method similar to that in the redactable signature scheme proposed by Johnson et al. [JMSW02] , which is based on the GGM tree [GGM86] . Let G : K → K × K be a length-doubling pseudo random number generator. First pick an arbitrary binary tree T with m leaves, where all internal nodes of T have exactly two children, the left and right child. Next, pick a seed t ∈ K uniformly at random, and associate it with the root. The pseudo random numbers r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r m are then computed from t in the usual top-down manner along the binary tree.
Hiding random numbers. If r i is to be removed, the associated leaf node and all its ancestors will be removed, as illustrated by the example in Figure 1(b) . The values associated with the roots of the remaining subtrees, and a description of the structure of the subtrees, form the new seed, whereby the remaining random values r j 's (j = i) can be re-computed. By the property of G, it is computationally difficult to guess the removed value r i from the new seed.
TreeGen: Given m, output a binary tree T with m leaves:
1. Pick a p uniformly at random from {1, 2, . . . , m − 1}. 2. Recursively generate a tree T1 with p leaves. 3. Recursively generate a tree T2 with m − p leaves. 4. Output a binary tree with T1 as the left subtree and T2 as the right subtree. Table 6 . TreeGen: a random tree generation algorithm Unlike the method proposed by Johnson et al. [JMSW02] , our tree T is randomly generated. If the tree is known to be balanced (or known to be of some fixed structure), some information on the number of leaf nodes removed can be derived from the redacted tree. Our random trees are generated by the probabilistic algorithm TreeGen in Table 6 . Note that descriptions of the structure of the tree are required for the regeneration of the random values r i 's.
At the moment, for ease of presentation, the descriptions are stored together with the seed. This increases the size of the seed. To reduce the size, we can replace the description by another short random seedt, which is assigned to the root. The random input required in Step 1 of the algorithm can be generated from t using G. A difference between the two methods of storing the (redacted) tree structure information is that in the former, we will have a information theoretic security result, whereas in the later, the security depends on the security of G.
Our main observation is as follows: after a substring of leaves is removed from the random tree, the remaining subtrees do not reveal (information theoretically) anything about the number of leaves removed, except the fact that at least one leaf has been removed at that location.
Notations.
Given a binary tree T , its leaf nodes can be listed from left to right to obtain a sequence. We call a subsequence of consecutive leaves a substring of leaves. After multiple substrings of leaves and all of their ancestor nodes are deleted, the remaining structures form a redacted tree 6 represented by two sequences, T = T 1 , T 2 , . . . , T v and b = m, b 1 , b 2 , . . . , b u . where T i 's are the subtrees retained, and each b i indicates that a substring was removed between the b i -th and (b i + 1)-th locations in the remaining sequence of leaf nodes. Let q i be the number of leaves that were removed in this substring. We call the sequence m, (b 1 , q 1 ), (b 2 , q 2 ) , . . . , (b u , q u ) the original annotation of b. Thus, the total number of leaf nodes removed is
Let us consider this process. Given an original annotation b 1 = m, (b 1 , q 1 ), (b 2 , q 2 ), . . . , (b u , q u ) , for a string of size m, a random tree T of size m + u i=1 q i is generated using TreeGen, and then redacted according to b 1 . Let RED(b 1 ) be the redacted tree.
From an adversary's point of view, he has RED(b 1 ), represented as (T, b), and wants to guess the q i 's in the original annotation b 1 , or the original total number of leaf nodes. We want to show that the additional knowledge of T does not improve his chances, compared to another adversary who only has b. It is suffice to show that, given any b and any two possible original annotations b 1 and b 2 , the conditional probabilities of obtaining (T, b) are the same. That is,
Theorem 4 For any redacted tree (T, b), any distribution B on the original annotation, and b
The proof is given in Appendix D.
6 SRSS: A Short Redactable Signature Scheme for Strings RSS produces a large signature, whose main portion is a sequence of true random numbers r i 's. We can combine RGGM with RSS to produce a short signature by replacing the r i 's with pseudo random numbers generated by RGGM. Let us call this combined scheme SRSS, short redactable signature scheme for strings.
It is easy to show that SRSS is unforgeable and privacy preserving from Lemma 1, Theorem 2, Theorem 3, Theorem 4, and the fact that RGGM is a pseudo random number generator.
Unforgeability.
From the definition of cryptographic secure pseudo random number generator and Theorem 2, we conclude that SRSS is unforgeable.
Corollary 5
For any positive polynomials (in κ) t and q, SRSS is (t, q, ǫ1 1−ǫ2 )-unforgeable against existential forgeries with respect to ≻, if SSS is (t+qt 0 , q, ǫ 1 )-unforgeable against existential forgeries with respect to ⊇, H is (t + qt 1 , ǫ 2 )-collision-resistant, and G is a cryptographic secure pseudo random number generator, where t 0 is the running time of H, t 1 is the time needed by SRSS to sign a document, and κ is the security parameter.
Privacy.
From the definition of cryptographic secure pseudo random number generator, Theorem 3 and Theorem 4, we conclude that SRSS is privacy preserving.
Corollary 6
The redactable signature scheme SRSS is privacy preserving (as defined in Definition 3), assuming that the hash function h satisfies the property: Efficiency. The improvement of SRSS is in signature size. Given the unredacted string, the size of the signature is κ + 2k, where κ is the signature size of SSS, and k is the length of each seed. Recall that we need two seeds in RGGM, one for the generation of the numbers, and the other for the tree structure.
If t substrings are removed, the signature size is κ + tk + O(kt log m), where the term tk is for the witness, and O(kt log m) is required for the RGGM.
Other variants
Allowing removal of empty substring
Both RSS and SRSS do not allow removal of empty substrings. In fact, it is considered to be a forgery if a censor declares that a substring has been removed but actually he/she doesnot remove anything.
It is desirable to allow removal of empty substrings in some application scenarios. This can be achieved by slight modifications to our schemes. To sign a string x 1 x 2 . . . x m , special symbol ♮ is inserted to obtain the expanded string x = ♮x 1 ♮x 2 ♮ . . . ♮x m ♮ which will be signed directly using RSS or SRSS. To remove a substring x 0 , the expanded substring of x 0 is actually removed. In the case where a substring has already being removed in front or at the end of x 0 , the ♮ is not included at the front or the end accordingly. To remove an empty substring, simply remove the ♮ at intended location.
Hiding the fact that the string is redacted
There is a question on whether one should hide the location of a removed substring or even the occurrence of redaction. This requirement is also known as invisibility or transparency [ACMT05, MHI06] . For a small object space, if invisibility is satisfied, a censor may take a long signed string, remove some substrings to form an arbitrary "authentic" short string. Nevertheless, some applications may need invisibility.
Here is a simple variation of RSS that achieves this. To sign a string, simply add a special symbols ♯ in-between any two consecutative objects. Sign the expanded string and then immediately redact it by removing all ♯'s. Redaction and verification is the same as before.
However, this variant produces a large signature even if we use SRSS. Furthermore, the computation during verification is high. At least Ω(m 2 ) exponentiation operations are required.
To reduce the size of signature, there is an alternative: sign all the pairs of objects. To sign the string x = x 1 x 2 x 3 . . . x m , first generate random numbers r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r m such that r i x i 's are distinct. Next, let t be the set of all pairs {(r i x i , r j x j )} i<j and employ SSS to sign t. When an object x i is to be removed, simply remove all the pairs that involve x i from t.
Since the role of r i is to ensure that all elements are distinct, the size of each r i can be smaller than the random numbers required by RSS.
Discussion and Conclusion
We considered a simple but difficult requirement in redactable signature scheme: hiding the lengths of the removed substrings. We exploited an intriguing statistical property of random trees, and employed a hash from strings to unordered sets to achieve the requirement. Although the signature is short, its size still depends on the number of substrings removed and the length of the string. In contrast, there are known schemes for unordered sets, whose signature size is a constant. Intuitively, the larger signature size is the price that we need pay for the ordering information. To keep the same ratio of message space size to the signature space size, the signature size of string with length m should be about m log m times larger than that for corresponding unordered set. The computation time required during verification is high for long strings when many substrings are removed. It is interesting to find a practical way to organize the string hierarchically, so as to achieve speedup.
The two main components, the hash H and the RGGM tree, proposed in this paper, could be of independent interests. The hash function may play a role in the design of transitive signature with additional property on privacy preservation. Many secure outsourced database applications involve Merkel tree or GGM tree. The hiding property of the RGGM tree may be useful in those applications. intractable 7 and always outputs odd prime integers, and Strong RSA Problem is hard.
Proof. (Sketch) Suppose there exists a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm A, which takes as input (r 1 , w 1 ), and outputs (x 1 , e 1 ), (x 2 , e 2 ), and (r 2 , w 2 ), such that ((x 2 , e 2 ), (r 2 , w 2 )) is a collision with ((x 1 , e 1 ), (r 1 , w 1 ) ) with noticeable probability.
We first consider the special case where w 1 = g, g, . . . , g m g's and e 1 = m .
Let x 1 = x 1,1 x 1,2 . . . x 1,m , x 2 = x 2,1 x 2,2 . . . x 2,m ′ , r 1 = r 1,1 , r 1,2 , . . . , r 1,m , r 2 = r 2,1 , r 2,2 , . . . , r 2,m ′ , w 2 = w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w m ′ for some m ′ < m. By the definition of collision, we have (x 1 , e 1 ) ≻ (x 2 , e 2 ) ∧ H((x 2 , e 2 ), (r 2 , w 2 )) = {t 2,1 , . . . , t 2,m ′ } ⊂ H((x 1 , e 1 ), (r 1 , w 1 )) = {t 1,1 , . . . , t 1,m },
There are two different cases of collisions: 1) x 2 is not a substring of x 1 , e.g. x 1 = abc, x 2 = cb; 2) x 2 is a substring of x 1 but their annotations e 1 and e 2 are incompatible, e.g. x 1 = abc, w 1 = ggg, e 1 = 3 , and x 2 = ac, w 2 = gg, e 2 = 2 .
Case 1: x 2 is not a substring of x 1 . the sequence t 2,1 , t 2,2 , · · · , t 2,m ′ must be a re-permutation of some subsequence of the sequence 
). Next we can conduct a case analysis based on whether EF divides A, to find a contradiction with our assumptions. If EF does not divide A (with noticeable probability), we could solve the Strong RSA Problem based on algorithm A using similar techniques in the proof of Theorem 5 in [GHR99]; otherwise we could solve the Division Problem [GHR99] .
Case 2: x 2 is a substring of x 1 but they have incompatible annotations. Let e 3 be the annotation such that (x 1 , e 1 ) ≻ (x 2 , e 3 ). Let w 3 = w 3,1 . . . w 3,m ′ be the witness obtained from step 1 of Table 5 when redacting ((x 1 , e 1 ), (r 1 , w 1 )) to produce a signature for the annotated substring (x 2 , e 3 ). We know H((x 2 , e 3 ), (r 2 , w 3 )) ⊂ H((x 1 , e 1 ), (r 1 , w 1 )) 7 Division intractability [GHR99] implies collision resistance. and H((x 2 , e 2 ), (r 2 , w 2 )) ⊂ H((x 1 , e 1 ), (r 1 , w 1 )).
Because distinct random numbers r 1,i 's and r 2,j 's are involved in the output of H, we conclude that H((x 2 , e 3 ), (r 2 , w 3 )) = H((x 2 , e 2 ), (r 2 , w 2 )). We also know w 2 and w 3 implies different annotations e 2 and e 3 , so w 2 = w 3 . That means there exists an index i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m ′ , such that w 2,i = w 3,i and w
where Q = i j=1 h(r 2,j ) is an odd number. Recall that n = pq, p = 2p ′ + 1, q = 2q ′ + 1 and p, q, p ′ , q ′ are all prime numbers. Let λ(n) = lcm(p − 1, q − 1) = 2p ′ q ′ . Suppose Q is coprime with λ(n). Then w Q 2,i = w Q 3,i mod n implies w 2,i = w 3,i , which is a contradiction with Eq 1. So we conclude that the odd number Q and λ(n) = 2p ′ q ′ have common factors, i.e., p ′ or q ′ divides Q. W.L.O.G., we assume p ′ |Q. Because h(·) outputs odd prime number only, there must exist ξ, 1 ≤ ξ ≤ m ′ , h(r 2,ξ ) = p ′ . Consequently, 2h(r 2,ξ ) + 1 divides n, and we can factorize n efficiently by trying every h(r 2,i ), 1 ≤ i ≤ m ′ . In the beginning of the proof, we assume that w 1 = g, . . . , g . For case 1, it is easy to generalize the proof for general w 1 = w 1,1 , w 1,2 , . . . , w 1,m using similar techniques in the proof of Theorem 5 in [GHR99] , by randomly guessing the index a and setting w 1,a = s; for case 2, there is no need of changes in the proof.
B Proof of Theorem 2
Theorem 2. The scheme RSS as constructed in Table 3, Table 4 and Table 5 , is (t, q, ǫ1 1−ǫ2 )-secure against existential forgeries with respect to ≻, if SSS is (t + qt 0 , q, ǫ 1 )-secure against existential forgeries with respect to ⊇, and H is (t + qt 1 , ǫ 2 )-collision-resistant, where t 0 is the running time of H and t 1 is the time needed by RSS to sign a document.
Proof: We prove this theorem using proof by contradiction. Let O RSS and O SSS denote the oracles for Sign algorithms of RSS and SSS respectively, and both use the same public/private key (PK, SK). Suppose there exists an adversary A against RSS, such that A runs in time at most t, makes at most q chosen-message queries to O RSS , and has advantage AdvA > ǫ 3 = ǫ1 1−ǫ2 . Let x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x ℓ denote the ℓ(≤ q) messages (annotated strings of objects) chosen by A, and (σ i , r i ) be the reply from O RSS for query x i . Let (x, (σ, r)) denote the output of A. AdvA = Pr (Verify PK (x, (r, σ)) = TRUE ∧ x ∈ span ≻ (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x ℓ )) > ǫ 3 . Now we construct an adversary B against SSS invoking A as a subroutine and simulating O RSS with O SSS :
